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Objective: Emotional distress after a diagnosis of cancer is normal and, for most people, will diminish
over time. However, a significant minority of patients with cancer experience persistent or recurrent
symptoms of emotional distress for which they need help. A model developed in mental health, the
self-regulatory executive function model (S-REF), specifies that maladaptive metacognitive beliefs and
processes, including persistent worry, are key to understanding why such emotional problems persist.
This cross-sectional study explored, for the first, time whether metacognitive beliefs were associated with
emotional distress in a cancer population, and whether this relationship was mediated by worry, as
predicted by the S-REF model. Method: Two hundred twenty-nine participants within 3 months of
diagnosis of, and before treatment for, primary breast or prostate cancer completed self-report question-
naires measuring anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, metacognitive
beliefs, worry, and illness perceptions. Results: Regression analysis showed that metacognitive beliefs
were associated with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and PTSD, and explained additional variance in
these outcomes after controlling for age, gender, and illness perceptions. Structural equation modeling
was consistent with cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory that metacognitive beliefs cause
and maintain distress both directly and indirectly by driving worry. Conclusions: The findings provide
promising first evidence that the S-REF model may be usefully applied in cancer. Further study is
required to establish the predictive and clinical utility of these findings.
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Emotional distress is a normal response after cancer that, for
most people, resolves spontaneously over time (Brennan, 2004;
Salmon, 2000). However, for some, it persists for years after
treatment (Burgess et al., 2005; Helgeson, Snyder, & Seltman,
2004). For instance, annual prevalence of major depression or
generalized anxiety disorder remains 22% in the fourth year after
breast cancer diagnosis (Burgess et al., 2005), and lifetime prev-
alence of cancer-related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is
10% to 12% for breast cancer and 20% for other cancers (An-
drykowski & Kangas, 2010).
In recognition of this continuing psychological impact, health
policies recommend that all patients undergo systematic psycho-
logical assessment at key points from diagnosis and have prompt
access to psychological support (Holland, 1999; Institute of Med-
icine, 2007; National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,
2004). However, specialist help is limited and few patients have
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access to it. Most psychological care that is provided is offered
reactively, that is, at the time of emotional crisis (Zabora et al.,
2001). Moreover, there is little evidence that available psycholog-
ical treatments are effective, with only small controlled effects
sizes for anxiety (0.24) and depression (0.26) found in a recent
meta-analysis (Naaman, Radwan, Fergusson, & Johnson, 2009) of
breast cancer studies with high internal validity. Given that ap-
proximately 20% of patients experience clinically significant dis-
tress at some point in their cancer journey, a more cost-effective
and ethical approach would be to identify the psychological pro-
cesses that cause persistent distress so that a targeted preventative
intervention can be provided.
Current theoretical approaches to understanding the causes of
persistent distress after cancer share a common basis within the
“cognitive paradigm,” that is, the view that distress is maintained
by the individual’s negative appraisal of the illness. Initially, much
of the research using these approaches was aimed at identifying
specific coping strategies thought to mediate this relationship.
However, this body of research yielded little of practical benefit
(Somerfield, 1997). Consequently, research moved away from
focusing on coping alone, toward understanding individuals’ cog-
nitive representation of their cancer, in particular, the role of
illness perceptions (comprising individuals’ thoughts, ideas, and
beliefs about their illness) using the framework of Leventhal’s
common-sense model (CSM) of self-regulation in health and ill-
ness (Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984). Cross-sectional studies
have confirmed associations between various illness perception
dimensions and psychological outcomes in cancer (e.g., Dempster
et al., 2012; Millar, Purushotham, McLatchie, George, & Murray,
2005; Rozema, Vollink, & Lechner, 2009; Scharloo et al., 2010;
Traeger et al., 2009). However, a causal role for illness perceptions
has yet to be demonstrated.
The fact that illness perceptions are not causally implicated in
emotional distress is understandable, as most individuals receiving
a diagnosis of cancer will experience some negative thoughts
about cancer, yet not everyone experiences persistent distress.
Negative thoughts are generally fleeting, and individuals’ thoughts
about their cancer in the early stages are likely to be unstable as the
individual is assailed with new information and experiences. Such
illness-related thoughts only become a problem if the individual
responds to them by engaging in excessive worry. Thus, it is probably
not the illness perceptions per se, but the selection and use of worry
in response to the negative thoughts that they trigger, which leads to
persistent emotional distress. Worry is prevalent in cancer and, al-
though a certain level is considered normal and adaptive, individuals
who experience high levels of generalized worry are more like to feel
helpless in response to their concerns (Parle, Jones, & Maguire, 1996)
and to develop more negative illness perceptions (Lehto & Cimprich,
2009). However, cognitive models such as the CSM do not elaborate
what causes such persistent worry.
An alternative and potentially more useful approach to under-
standing both what drives worry and what causes emotional dis-
tress after cancer is provided by the transdiagnostic self-regulatory
executive function model (S-REF; Wells & Mathews, 1994). For
most people, periods of distress in relation to cancer, or any other
stressor, are transitory. However, the S-REF model proposes that
distress becomes persistent when stored metacognitive beliefs
guide the individual to select a particularly toxic style of sustained
and inflexible conscious processing, known as the cognitive atten-
tional syndrome (CAS). This includes cognitive processes such as
persistent worry, focusing of attention on threat, and maladaptive
coping strategies (e.g., avoidance or thought suppression). Contin-
uation of the CAS is central to the development and maintenance
of emotional disorder, although, as in traditional cognitive theory,
it is dysfunctional beliefs that are considered key as to why it
persists. However, in contrast to traditional cognitive theory, the
S-REF model proposes that it is metacognitive beliefs, rather than
the specific content of beliefs, about cancer that are important.
Thus, the model proposes that activation and persistence of worry
are fuelled by two types of metacognitive belief: positive beliefs
about the benefits of, and need to engage in, worry (e.g., “If I
worry about recurrence, I’ll detect early signs or symptoms”),
which activate it; and negative beliefs about the danger or uncon-
trollability of worry (e.g., “I can’t stop worrying about my cancer
returning”), which maintain and exacerbate it. According to this
model, negative thoughts about cancer may activate metacognitive
beliefs and worry, or may be a product of worry, but do not
directly cause or maintain distress.
Challenging metacognitive beliefs and modifying components
of the CAS have been used successfully to treat depression and a
range of anxiety disorders in mental health settings (see Wells,
2009, for a review). In addition, metacognitive beliefs have been
associated with heightened emotional distress in two physical
health conditions: Parkinson’s disease (Allott, Wells, Morrison, &
Walker, 2005) and chronic fatigue (Maher-Edwards, Fernie, Mur-
phy, Nikcevic, & Spada, 2012). However, the utility of this model
for explaining distress after cancer has not yet been explored.
The S-REF model predicts that negative illness perceptions will
be associated with increased emotional distress, as has already
been shown. However, due to the putative causal role of metacog-
nitive beliefs about worry in activating and exacerbating the CAS
in response to such cognitions, the S-REF model makes two new
predictions. First, the model predicts that metacognitive beliefs
will be able to explain additional variance in emotional distress,
over and above that explained by negative illness perceptions.
Second, it predicts that the relationship between metacognitive
beliefs and emotional distress will be mediated by worry. Specif-
ically, positive metacognitive beliefs will cause emotional distress
by activating worry, but will have no direct effect, whereas neg-
ative metacognitive beliefs will maintain emotional distress both
by triggering a direct emotional response and through exacerbating
worry, including worry about worrying (metaworry).
This study aims to test these predictions by examining, for the
first time, the relative contribution of negative illness perceptions
and metacognitive beliefs to emotional distress after diagnosis of
cancer and by testing the mediational role of worry.
Method
Participants
Participants were patients at least 18 years old attending
routine pretreatment clinics at a National Health Service teach-
ing hospital, after receiving a diagnosis of primary non meta-
static breast or prostate cancer. Patients were excluded if they
had recurrent or metastatic disease, or were considered by the
clinical team or researcher to be too distressed or confused to
give informed consent. The study was approved by the National
208 COOK, SALMON, DUNN, HOLCOMBE, CORNFORD, AND FISHER
Health Service North West 5 Research Ethics Committee (ref-
erence: 09/H1010/70).
Of 370 patients who were invited to participate, 258 (70%) con-
sented and 229 (62% of those approached, 89% of consenters) re-
turned completed questionnaires. There were no significant differ-
ences in age, gender, and tumor stage between consenting patients
who returned completed questionnaires and those who did not.
Measures
Emotional distress was measured using the Hospital Anxiety
and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and the
Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). The
HADS is a well-established measure specifically developed to
assess anxiety and depression in physically ill populations. Four-
teen items are scored on a 4-point scale yielding two subscale
scores of 0 to 21, with a cutoff score of 8 or more indicating a
clinically significant level of anxiety or depression. The HADS has
been extensively validated for use in cancer (Moorey et al., 1991;
Vodermaier & Millman, 2011). The Impact of Events Scale is a
15-item self-report scale developed to assess the subjective impact
of any specific event (e.g., diagnosis of cancer in this study).
Individual items are scored on a 4-point scale, yielding a total
score of 0 to 75, with high scores indicating more PTSD symp-
toms. In the current study, this single-factor model showed accept-
able fit, supporting the validity of using the total score. No con-
sensus exists on cutoff scores for clinically significant levels of
PTSD symptoms. However, a total score of 27 or more provided
an overall correct classification rate, for traumatic stress, of .80 in
a large sample of motor-vehicle-accident survivors including both
genders (Coffey, Gudmundsdottir, Beck, Palyo, & Miller, 2006),
and has previously been used for cancer (Purnell et al., 2011).
The Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised (Moss-Morris et
al., 2002) was used to assess negative illness perceptions. This
questionnaire comprises three parts, the first of which (Identity)
asks participants to indicate whether they have experienced any of
15 common symptoms (an additional item of particular relevance
to prostate patients—“urinary problems”—was added for this
study) since diagnosis and, if so, whether they attribute them to
cancer. Items endorsed as having been both experienced and
attributed to cancer are counted, providing a total score of 0 to 15.
As most patients with early-stage prostate and breast cancer ex-
perience few symptoms, this scale was dichotomized (no symp-
toms vs. 1 or more symptoms). The second part of the Illness
Perception Questionnaire-Revised comprises seven cognitive and
emotional representation subscales. Items are scored from 1 to 5,
with high scores on the Chronic Timeline, Consequences, and
Cyclical Timeline subscales indicating a stronger belief that the
illness will last a long time, have negative consequences, and be
cyclical in nature, respectively, and high scores on the Personal
Control, Treatment Control, and Illness Coherence subscales indi-
cating a stronger belief in the controllability of the illness and a
greater personal understanding of it, respectively. As this measure
was included to assess patients’ cognitive representations, the
emotional representation subscale was discarded. The final part, in
which items are also scored 1 to 5, measures patients’ causal
attributions about their illness. Previously, only psychological
and/or behavioral attributions have contributed to the variance
explained in quality of life (Scharloo et al., 2010) or emotional
distress (Kulik & Kronfeld, 2005; Traeger et al., 2009) after
diagnosis of cancer. Therefore, for this study, the seven items that
reflect these attributions (i.e., “my own behavior,” “my mental
attitude,” “stress or worry,” “my emotional state,” “my personal-
ity,” “family problems or worries,” and “overwork”) were used to
generate a composite scale (Psychological Cause), and the rest of
the items were discarded.
Metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognitions
Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). The
MCQ-30 was developed specifically to assess key components of the
metacognitive model of emotional disorder. It comprises five sub-
scales: Positive Beliefs About Worry, Negative Beliefs About the
Danger and Uncontrollability of Worry, Cognitive Confidence, Need
to Control Thoughts, and Cognitive Self-Consciousness. The validity
of this five-factor model was supported using the current study data.
However, as the focus of this study was on testing specific predictions
about the relationship of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs
about worry with emotional distress, the latter three subscales were
discarded. For each subscale of the MCQ-30, items are scored from 1
to 4, yielding total scores of 6 to 24. Participants are asked to indicate
how much they generally agree with statements such as “Worrying
helps me cope” (Positive Beliefs About Worry subscale) and “My
worrying is dangerous for me” (Negative Beliefs About Worry sub-
scale). High scores indicate more positive and negative beliefs about
worry, respectively.
Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ
is a well-established measure developed to assess the level of
worry independent of worry content. Participants are asked to rate
to what extent statements, such as “When I am under pressure I
worry a lot” are “typical of me.” Sixteen items are scored from 1
to 5, yielding a total score of 16 to 80, with higher scores indicat-
ing greater worry. However, a single-factor model fit the study
data poorly. Some previous studies have indicated a two-factor
model (Fresco, Heimberg, Mennin, & Turk, 2002; Yilmaz, Gen-
çöz, & Wells, 2008), with positively (PSWQ ve) and negatively
(PSWQ ve) phrased items loading on separate factors. This
model (with the exception of Item 10, “I never worry about
anything,” which loaded on both factors) provided the best fit to
the study data and was therefore used in the present study, with
Item 10 allowed to cross-load.
The Cognitive Attentional Syndrome Scale (CAS-I; Wells,
2009) was included as an alternative to the PSWQ. Developed
primarily as a clinical tool, it is a state measure comprising two
distinct parts. The first eight items, scored on a scale from 0 to 8,
assess CAS processes and the extent to which individuals have been
using maladaptive strategies to cope with negative thoughts or feel-
ings. The second eight items assess metacognitive beliefs about the
CAS and were redundant in this study due to inclusion of the MCQ-
30. Good internal consistency and significant positive correlations
with measures of depression, anxiety, and stress have been reported
for the CAS-I scale as a whole (Fergus, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2012). For
the present study, preliminary exploratory factor analysis of the first
eight items indicated that a three-factor model provided the best fit.
Items 1 (“How much time in the last week have you found yourself
dwelling on or worrying about your problems?”) and 2 (“How much
time in the last week have you been focusing attention on the things
you find threatening [e.g., symptoms, thoughts, danger]?”) loaded on
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the first factor and were summed to provide an alternative measure of
the frequency of worry, with the remaining items being disregarded.
The Medical Outcomes Study MOS social support survey (Sher-
bourne & Stewart, 1991) controlled for potential effects of perceived
emotional support on distress. This 19-item self-report measure was
designed to assess four separate dimensions of perceived support
among patients with chronic conditions. However, for this study, only
the subscales concerning emotional support (Emotional/Informational
Support, Positive Social Interaction, and Affectionate Support) were
used to produce a total score for “perceived emotional support.” As in
a previous study on breast cancer (Hill et al., 2011), this score was
dichotomized by designating the patients in the lowest third as having
low emotional support.
Procedure
Clinical staff identified suitable participants, who then received
recruitment letters and information sheets before their pretreatment
consultations. When patients attended the clinic, those willing to
see the researcher were given further information and asked for
written consent. Consenting patients completed the questionnaire
in the clinic on a handheld PC or on paper, as preferred. Those
with insufficient time were given the questionnaire (paper version)
to complete at home and return in a paid reply envelope.
Data Analysis
The data were analyzed using SPSS Version 20, Stata 9, and
Mplus v6.12. As fewer than 2% were missing at the scale level,
and these data were confirmed to be missing completely at ran-
dom, missing scores were imputed using the SPSS Expectation-
Maximization algorithm (Little & Rubin, 1987). As not all scales
were normally distributed, this study used nonparametric statistics
or bootstrapping techniques to ensure findings were robust.
Nonparametric statistics (Mann-Whitney or Kruskal-Wallis) were
used to compare outcomes by age group (dichotomized at the me-
dian), gender, educational level, perceived emotional social support,
and stage of disease. When significant differences were found, these
variables were entered as covariates in the subsequent analyses.
Preliminary regression analyses were used to identify the illness
perceptions associated with each outcome (anxiety, depression,
and PTSD symptoms), after controlling for covariates.
To test the first prediction from the S-REF model, separate
hierarchical multiple regression analyses first tested the associa-
tion of each outcome with metacognitive beliefs, after controlling
for identified covariates. These analyses were then repeated, also
controlling for the illness perceptions found in preliminary regres-
sion analysis to be associated with that outcome. To control for
nonnormality, final regression models were robustly assessed us-
ing bootstrapped sampling in Stata 9. To test the second prediction
from the S-REF model, the data were fitted to the hypothesized
model (see Figure 1) using structural equation modeling (SEM) in
Mplus Version 6.12 (L. K. Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010). Be-
cause visual inspection suggests there are similarities between some
items on the PSWQ and the MCQ-30 subscale Negative Beliefs
About Worry, a second model substituting the CAS-I for the PSWQ
was included as an additional test to guard against bias due to
common method variance. Fit was assessed using the robust weighted
least squares estimator (B. Muthén, 1984; B. Muthén, du Toit, &
Spesic, 1997) recommended for ordinal categorical data (Brown,
2006). Analyses controlled for identified covariates and were con-
ducted initially using the PSWQ, then repeated using the CAS-I.
Adequacy of model fit was assessed based on two incremental fit
indices—the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI), with values close to .95 indicating a well-fitting model
(Hu & Bentler, 1999)—and two absolute misfit indices—the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), with values .05
indicating good fit and 0.5 to .08 indicating adequate fit (Browne &
Cudeck, 1993), and the weighted root mean square residual (WRMR),
Table 1
Sample Characteristics (N  229)
Age
Mean (SD) 61.3 (8.9)
Range 38 to 85
n (% of total N)
Gender
Female 150 (66)
Male 79 (34)
Ethnicity
White Caucasian 224 (98)
Other 5 (2)
Marital status
Married/cohabiting 151 (66)
Live alone 46 (20)
Education
Left school without any qualifications 88 (38)
School qualifications or higher 132 (58)
Employment
Employed (full/part time) 88 (38)
Retired 99 (43)
Retired (health) 16 (7)
Homemaker 13 (6)
Unemployed 10 (4)
Cancer diagnosis
Breast 150 (66)
Prostate 79 (34)
Tumor grade
Low 56 (24)
Intermediate 107 (47)
High 62 (27)
Distress outcomes
Anxiety (HADS-A 7) 117 (51)
Depression (HADS-D 7) 28 (12)
PTSD symptoms (IES total 27) 136 (59)
Note. Missing data: marital status, n  5; live alone, n  3; education,
n  9; employment, n  3; tumor grade, n  4. HADS-(A/D)  Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale-(Anxiety/Depression); PTSD  posttrau-
matic stress disorder; IES  Impact of Events Scale.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Posive  
metacognive 
beliefs 
Negave  
metacognive 
beliefs 
Cognive 
aenonal 
syndrome 
Emoonal 
distress 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Figure 1. Hypothesized path model of the relationship between metacogni-
tive beliefs and emotional distress. Solid lines are predicted to be significant;
dotted lines are not significant; “” indicates positive direction of effect.
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with a cutoff value of .95 indicating good fit (Yu, 2002). For each
model, we first confirmed the fit of the measurement component by
simultaneously fitting the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) mea-
surement models for all the included latent variables, allowing them to
correlate. The data were then fitted to the structural component of
each model to assess the direct and indirect paths linking positive and
negative metacognitive beliefs to emotional distress.
Results
Of 229 participants who completed the questionnaire, 150 were
females with breast cancer and 79 were males with prostate cancer.
Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 1. A large pro-
portion exceeded cutoff scores for clinically significant anxiety
(51%) or PTSD symptoms (59%). Women with breast cancer were
more anxious (U 3722, p .001, r0.31) and reported more
PTSD symptoms (U  4105.5, p  .001, r  0.25) than men
with prostate cancer. Younger patients also reported more anxiety
(U  5117, p  .004, r  0.19), depression (U  5370, p 
.017, r  0.16), and PTSD symptoms (U  5238, p  .009,
r  0.17). However, no outcome was related to education,
perceived emotional support, or tumor grade. Therefore, age and
gender were the only covariates entered in subsequent analyses.
Results of the preliminary regression analyses are summarized
in Table 2. For anxiety and depression, the final model accounted
for 32% and 19% of the variance, respectively. After controlling
for age and gender, illness perceptions—specifically, higher scores
on Identity, Chronic Timeline, Consequences (for anxiety and
depression), and Psychological Causes (for anxiety)—explained
an additional 20% and 18% of the variance, respectively. In the
analysis of PTSD symptoms, the final model accounted for 34% of
the variance. Higher scores on the same four illness perception
scales, together with higher scores on Treatment Control and lower
scores on Illness Coherence, explained an additional 22% of the
variance in PTSD symptoms after controlling for age and gender.
These findings were confirmed as robust using bootstrapped sam-
pling.
The Association of Metacognitive Beliefs and Distress
Results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 3. After
controlling for age and gender, metacognitive beliefs explained
34% additional variance in anxiety and 14% in depression. Even
after controlling also for illness perceptions, metacognitive beliefs
added a further 23% and 9% in each outcome, respectively. The
final model for anxiety accounted for 52% of the variance. Both
the Positive Beliefs About Worry subscale and the Negative
Beliefs About Worry subscale made significant individual con-
tributions, with Negative Beliefs About Worry making the
largest contribution of all the predictors entered. The final
model for depression accounted for 25% of the variance, with
the Negative Beliefs About Worry subscale making the largest
contribution. Analysis of PTSD symptoms showed a similar
pattern (see Table 3). Metacognitive beliefs explained 29%
additional variance after controlling for age and gender, and
17% after controlling also for illness perceptions. The final
model explained 51% of the variance, with the Negative Beliefs
About Worry subscale again making the biggest contribution.
These findings, confirmed as robust using bootstrapped sam-
pling, support the first prediction from the S-REF model that
metacognitive beliefs add to the variance explained in distress and
trauma after controlling for illness perceptions, with negative
beliefs about worry making the biggest contribution to the variance
in each outcome.
SEM of the Relationship Between Metacognitive
Beliefs and Emotional Distress
Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed an excellent fit of the
data to the measurement model (see online supplemental materials
Table 2
Final Models of the Variance in Anxiety, Depression, and Trauma Explained by Illness Perceptions, After Controlling for Age
and Gender
Anxiety model Depression model PTSD symptoms model
R2 change Beta t Sig R2 change Beta t Sig R2 change Beta t Sig
Constant .56 .582 .79 .428 .75 .453
Gender .12 .33 5.49 .001 .01 .15 2.21 .028 .12 .27 4.44 .001
Age .06 .98 .326 .02 .28 .778 .15 2.45 .015
IPQ-R .20 .18 .22
Identity (0/1) .14 2.34 .020 .14 2.10 .037 .18 3.03 .003
Chronic timeline .17 2.20 .029 .18 2.11 .036 .16 2.11 .036
Cyclical timeline .12 1.82 .070 .10 1.46 .15 .02 .27 .786
Consequences .14 2.05 .041 .15 2.00 .046 .17 2.41 .017
Personal control .07 1.25 .212 .13 1.96 .051 .03 .53 .600
Treatment control .13 1.71 .088 .07 .82 .412 .19 2.63 .009
Illness coherence .00 .06 .951 .01 .17 .865 .20 3.16 .002
Psychological cause .22 3.45 .001 .10 1.42 .156 .16 2.61 .010
Model summary
R2 32 .19 .34
Adj R2 28 .15 .31
Note. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; Sig  significance; IPQ-R  Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised; Adj  adjusted.
 p  .001.
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for further details). The data were then fitted to the full latent
variable model, initially using the PSWQ to indicate the putative
mediating variable. Age and gender were controlled for within the
model (being correlated with the independent variable(s) by de-
fault, and having specified causal effects on the putative medi-
ator(s) and final outcome(s). The final path model for anxiety,
depression, and PTSD symptoms is shown in Figure 2. The
model was a good fit, 2(df  1617)  1922, p  .001,
RMSEA  .029 (90% confidence interval [CI] [.02, .03]),
CFI/TLI  .98/.98, WRMR  .89). As predicted, significant
direct effects were apparent from the Negative Beliefs About
Worry subscale to anxiety (  .50, p  .001) and PTSD
symptoms (  .70, p  .001), but not from the Positive Beliefs
About Worry subscale. In addition, there was a significant
indirect path from the Negative Beliefs About Worry subscale
to anxiety (  .16, p  .025), mediated by PSWQ ve, as
Table 3
Final Models of the Variance in Anxiety, Depression, and PTSD Symptoms Explained by Metacognitive Beliefs After Controlling for
Age and Gender (Model 1) and Age, Gender, and Illness Perceptions (Model 2)
Anxiety Model 1 Anxiety Model 2
R2 change Beta t Sig R2 change Beta t Sig
Constant 1.20 .233 1.19 .235
Gender .12 .22 4.38 .001 .12 .27 5.34 .001
Age .05 1.01 .312 .02 .48 .629
IPQ-R .17
Identity (0/1) .14 2.86 .005
Chronic timeline .10 1.85 .065
Consequences .07 1.24 .216
Psychological cause .10 2.09 .038
MCQ-30 .34 .23
POS .15 2.70 .007 .15 2.75 .006
NEG .52 9.13 .001 .44 7.92 .001
Model summary
R2 .46 .52
Adj R2 .45 .51
Depression Model 1 Depression Model 2
Constant .12 .903 2.31 .022
Gender .02 .05 .81 .417 .02 .12 1.87 .064
Age .00 .02 .983 .05 .74 .458
IPQ-R .14
Identity (0/1) .14 2.25 .026
Chronic timeline .17 2.54 .012
Consequences .11 1.59 .113
MCQ-30 .14 .09
POS .06 .82 .411 .06 .86 .391
NEG .36 5.09 .001 .29 .421 .001
Model summary
R2 .16 .25
Adj R2 .14 .22
PTSD symptoms Model 1 PTSD symptoms Model 2
Constant 3.07 .002 .33 .740
Gender .12 .15 2.90 .004 .12 .20 3.77 .001
Age .15 2.77 .006 .11 2.05 .041
IPQ-R .22
Identity (0/1) .17 3.28 .001
Chronic timeline .09 1.30 .194
Consequences .12 2.02 .045
Treatment control .10 1.56 .122
Illness coherence .16 2.95 .004
Psychological cause .05 .99 .322
MCQ-30 .29 .17
POS .12 2.09 .037 .09 1.58 .115
NEG .49 8.25 .001 .41 7.14 .001
Model summary
R2 .41 .51
Adj R2 .40 .48
Note. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; Sig  significance; IPQ-R  Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised; MCQ-30  Metacognitions
Questionnaire 30; POS  Positive Beliefs About Worry subscale; NEG  Negative Beliefs About Worry subscale; Adj  adjusted.
 p  .001.
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predicted. However, there were no significant direct or indirect
paths from the Negative Beliefs About Worry subscale to
depression, and no indirect path mediated by worry to PTSD
symptoms. In addition, the paths from the Positive Beliefs
About Worry subscale to both PSWQ ve and PSWQ ve
were not significant.
The model testing was then repeated using the CAS-I subscale
as the mediating variable instead of the PSWQ. The final path
model is shown in Figure 3. The model was a good fit, 2(df 
919)  1189, p  .001, RMSEA  .037 (90% CI [.03, .04]),
CFI/TLI .98/.97, WRMR .91. The pattern of significant direct
paths seen above was replicated; there were significant direct effects
of Negative Beliefs About Worry on anxiety (  .43, p .001) and
PTSD symptoms (  .36, p  .001). In addition, there was also a
significant indirect effect via the CAS-I on all three outcomes (indi-
rect effects: anxiety,   .24, p  .001; depression,   .22, p 
.017; PTSD symptoms,   .32 p .001). There was no effect of the
Positive Beliefs About Worry subscale on either the CAS-I or any of the
outcomes.
Discussion
This is the first study to explore the utility of the S-REF model
in an adult cancer population, and, although only cross-sectional,
findings are largely consistent with the theory that metacognitive
beliefs and perseverative thinking (worry), rather than specific
illness perceptions, cause and maintain emotional distress.
The Relationship Between Metacognitive Beliefs and
Distress
Negative illness perceptions were associated with distress after
cancer diagnosis, consistent with both the CSM and S-REF mod-
els. However, after controlling for age and gender, metacognitive
beliefs could explain more of the remaining variance than could
illness perceptions for two of the three study outcomes (anxiety,
34% vs. 20%; PTSD symptoms, 29% vs. 22%). In addition, after
controlling for age, gender, and illness perceptions, metacognitive
beliefs added significantly to the variance in anxiety, depression,
and PTSD symptoms, while, in each case, the Negative Beliefs
About Worry made the biggest individual contribution to the
variance out of all of the predictors. These latter findings are
consistent with the S-REF model and with results of previous
studies in mental health populations (see Wells, 2009, for a re-
view), the general population (Spada, Mohiyeddini, & Wells,
2008), and Parkinson’s disease patients (Allott et al., 2005), in
which the Negative Beliefs About Worry subscale was the pre-
dominant contributor to the variance in anxiety and depression.
The regression analysis also indicated that a second set of
metacognitive beliefs, the Positive Beliefs About Worry subscale,
made a unique contribution to the variance in anxiety. This finding
is consistent with the metacognitive model of generalized anxiety
disorder (Wells, 1995), in which positive metacognitive beliefs
guide the selection of worry as an effective coping strategy, which,
in turn, increases emotional distress.
Mediation of the Relationship Between Metacognitive
Beliefs and Distress by the CAS
The S-REF model proposes that the causal link between meta-
cognitive beliefs and distress is the CAS, and, in this respect, the
findings partially support predictions from the model. Specifically,
the relationship of anxiety with Negative Beliefs About Worry was
partially mediated, as predicted, by the PSWQ, and the relationship
of all three emotional distress outcomes with the Negative Beliefs
About Worry subscale was partially mediated by the CAS-1. That
is, the findings are broadly consistent with the theory that negative
metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “worry is uncontrollable and danger-
ous”) cause a direct emotional response (anxiety and trauma symp-
toms), while also further increasing distress by exacerbating worry
and activating metaworry (e.g., “I worry too much about worry-
ing”). The absence of any direct effect of the Negative Beliefs
About Worry subscale on depression may reflect the wording of
PSWQ-ve
PSWQ+ve
.75 
.50 
.22 
NEG 
POS 
.59 
.76 
DEPRESSION 
ANXIETY 
PTSD 
SYMPTOMS 
.42 
.58 
.70 
.28 
Figure 2. Final path model of relationship of positive and negative
metacognitive beliefs with anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress
disorder symptoms, including mediation by worry (Penn State Worry
Questionnaire [PSWQ]). Solid lines, p  .05, with standardized coeffi-
cients; dotted lines are not significant. Measurement model component of
full structural equation model and pathways for covariates (age and gender)
is not shown but is available on request from corresponding author.
Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 subscales: Positive Beliefs About Worry
(POS); Negative Beliefs About Worry (NEG). PSWQ subscales: positively
phrased items (PSWQ ve); negatively phrased (PSWQ ve).
NEG 
CAS-I 
POS .43 
.34 
.36 
.48 
.67 
.31 
.59 
.76 
DEPRESSION 
ANXIETY 
PTSD 
SYMPTOMS 
 
.36 
.48 
.36 
Figure 3. Final path model of relationship between positive and negative
metacognitive beliefs and anxiety, depression, and trauma mediated by the
CAS-I. Solid lines, p .05, with standardized coefficients; dotted lines are
not significant. Measurement model component of full structural equation
model and pathways for covariates (age and gender) is not shown but is
available on request from corresponding author. Metacognitions Question-
naire 30 subscales: Positive Beliefs About Worry (POS); Negative Beliefs
About Worry (NEG).
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this measure, which focuses specifically on beliefs about worry as
opposed to other forms of persistent thinking (i.e., rumination) that
are more closely associated with depression.
The hypothesis of full mediation between positive metacogni-
tive beliefs and emotional distress—that is, that positive beliefs
about worry, such as “worrying will help me notice if my cancer
recurs,” causes emotional distress by driving worry about recur-
rence and self-focused attention—was not supported. However,
S-REF theory would predict that, although positive metacognitive
beliefs initially guide an individual toward the selection of CAS
processes (i.e., worry) in response to negative thoughts or
feelings, it is the negative metacognitive beliefs that “turbo
charge” distress by then exacerbating and maintaining these pro-
cesses. Thus, it is possible that, in a SEM that simultaneously tests
the pathways between both sets of metacognitive beliefs and
emotional distress, the indirect pathway from the Positive Beliefs
About Worry subscale to emotional distress via the CAS is masked
by inclusion of Negative Beliefs About Worry.
Study Implications, Limitations, and Conclusions
In summary, the findings support predictions from the S-REF
model that negative metacognitive beliefs cause and maintain
distress by activating the CAS. However, because the study was
cross-sectional, causality cannot be assumed; maladaptive meta-
cognition may be a consequence of emotional distress, not a cause,
and, as these two opposing models would be mathematically
equivalent, SEM would be unable to distinguish between them.
Therefore, a prospective test of the model is necessary in order to
establish temporal precedence of maladaptive metacognition to
persistent distress as more compelling evidence of causation. Fur-
thermore, as the SEM was based on the assumption of no hidden
confounders, the potential influence of unmeasured common
causes cannot be eliminated. In particular, the information avail-
able from patients at the time of assessment did not include their
history of anxiety, depression, or PTSD symptoms. Consequently,
it is possible that, rather than maladaptive metacognitions causing
elevated emotional distress, both are consequences of a premorbid
psychiatric history. Another limitation is the sample. To balance
the competing demands of maximizing recruitment and generaliz-
ability, while minimizing prognostic variability, sampling was
restricted to the largest tumor groups in each gender—breast and
prostate cancer; it cannot be assumed that findings would gener-
alize to other cancers, particularly those with poorer prognosis.
Although we controlled for gender (and therefore type of tumor) in
the analyses, the study was insufficiently powered for subgroup
analyses. Further studies will be needed to test the stability of
association of metacognitive beliefs with emotional distress across
different tumor populations.
Despite these limitations, this study provides the first evidence
of the applicability of the S-REF model to understanding emo-
tional distress and trauma after diagnosis of cancer. Therefore, we
suggest that there is potential to reduce vulnerability to emotional
distress and trauma by modifying metacognitive beliefs and pro-
cesses rather than using more traditional cognitive therapies. In a
cancer context, an important potential advantage of this metacog-
nitive approach to therapy is that it does not require engagement
with the content of negative thoughts about cancer, which many
individuals can find difficult or distressing (Baker et al., 2013).
However, in order to explore this potential more fully, further
study, both prospective and experimental, is warranted.
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